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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Texas’s case law and legislative activity 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016. 
II. Case Law 
A. Title and Conveyancing 
1. Hysaw v. Dawkins1 (Will Construction; Fixed vs. Floating Royalty) 
Ethel Hysaw (“Ethel”) had three children, and devised her land in Karnes 
County, Texas to them. Each child was given a tract (each differing in size) 
in fee simple; however, as to the minerals,  
[e]ach of my children shall have and hold an undivided one-third 
(1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or other 
minerals in or under or that may be produced from any of said 
lands, the same being a non-participating royalty interest . . .2 
Ethel’s will further provided that (1) each child “shall receive one-third 
of one-eighth royalty, provided there is no royalty sold or conveyed by me 
covering the lands so willed,” and (2) should there be any royalty sold 
during the lifetime, then each child “shall each receive one-third of the 
remainder of the unsold royalty.”3 
Some of the heirs believed a fixed one-twenty-fourth royalty was Ethel’s 
intent because of the specific language “one-third of one-eighth.” Others 
argued that a fixed fraction (multiplying the double fractions in Ethel’s 
will):  
(1) [was] discordant with will language, evincing an intent that 
the siblings share royalties equally; (2) [added] language not 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016). 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. Id. at 5-6. 
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found in the deed by inserting a fixed, single fraction of 1/24; 
and (3) [created] disharmony among the provisions by mixing 
fractional royalty interests with fractions of royalty interests to 
produce unequal treatment of Ethel’s children.4 
The trial court ruled that each child was entitled to a floating royalty (or 
that the royalties should be divided equally); however, the appellate court 
reversed, finding that each child was entitled to a fixed royalty, being a one-
twenty-fourth royalty, with the excess to go to that sibling owning fee-
simple title to the subject tract.5  
The Supreme Court first provided background on mineral interests and 
the double-fraction dilemma, noting that “historical standardization” of the 
one-eighth royalty will not alter clear and unambiguous language that can 
otherwise be harmonized.6 The Court went on to reiterate its commitment 
to a holistic approach aimed at ascertaining intent from all words and all 
parts of the conveying instrument and found that the appellate court erred 
by analyzing each royalty provision in isolation instead of examining the 
will language as a whole.7  
The Court did not think that the size variations of the tracts conveyed to 
each child indicated that Ethel favored one child over any other, but instead 
considered “all the other language” in the four corners of Ethel’s will in 
order to determine her intent.8 The Court found that Ethel intended to treat 
her children equally, and as such, the royalties should be equally divided 
among them. In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically considered: 
(1) The deliberate recitation of identical language to effect each 
child’s royalty inheritance; (2) the use of double fractions in lieu 
of a single fixed fraction . . . ; (3) the first royalty provision’s 
global application to all the children and the second provision’s 
language restating the royalty devise of each child individually; 
and (4) the equal-sharing language in the third and final royalty 
clause.9  
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. Id. at 6-7. 
 6. Id. at 9-10. 
 7. Id. at 12. 
 8. Id. at 13-14 (noting that, although the daughters received larger sized tracts, the 
intrinsic value of the land bequeathed to Ethel’s son is express). 
 9. Id. at 15. 
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Further, the third royalty clause provided testamentary intent of equal 
sharing between the children, as it provided that each child would “receive 
one-third of the remainder of the unsold royalty.”10  
“When the terms of a mineral conveyance are in dispute, our objective is 
to effectuate the parties’ intent as expressed within the four corners of the 
conveyancing instrument.”11 Looking beyond “a mechanical approach 
requiring rote multiplication of double fractions,” the court considered “the 
testatrix’s will in its entirety, [and held] that she intended her children to 
share future royalties equally, bequeathing to each child a 1/3 floating 
royalty, not a 1/24 fixed royalty.”12  
While this decision does not provide a bright-line rule or test, it does 
provide instruction that a court will consider an instrument’s language as a 
whole in order to deduce intent. 
2. Wenske v. Ealy13 (Deed Construction; Reservations and Exceptions) 
In 1988, the Wenskes acquired a tract of land, subject to prior 
reservations totaling a one-fourth nonparticipating royalty interest 
(“NPRI”). In 2003, the Wenskes conveyed the property to the Ealys, 
reserving a three-eighths mineral interest. The 2003 deed to the Ealys was 
made subject to “Several Reservations and Exceptions to Conveyance and 
Warranty ‘for all purposes,’” including the NPRI.14 In 2011, both the 
Wenskes and Ealys executed oil and gas leases. In 2013, the Wenskes 
sought declaratory judgment declaring that the three-eighths interest they 
reserved was taken “free and clear” of the NPRI. The trial court granted the 
Ealys’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the NPRI burdened the 
mineral owners proportionately. The appellate court affirmed.15  
On appeal, the Court examined both the 1988 and 2003 deeds, noting 
that “the 1988 deed reserved…a royalty interest that is carved out of the 
total production achieved under a mineral lease, [and therefore] is 
considered a fraction of royalty or floating royalty.”16 The Wenskes argued 
that because the conveyance to the Ealys was made “subject to” outstanding 
NPRIs, the Ealys should have borne the entire royalty, and the Wenskes’s 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at 15. 
 11. Id. at 16. 
 12. Id. at 4-5. 
 13. No. 13-15-00012-CV, 2016 WL 363735 (Tex. App. Jan. 28, 2016). 
 14. Id. at *1. 
 15. Id. at *2. 
 16. Id. at *4 (citing Medina Interests Ltd. v. Trial, 469 S.W. 619, 623 (Tex. App. 2015). 
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interest should not be burdened by the NPRI.17 The Court, however, 
disagreed, stating that “because the 2003 Deed provides no guidance on this 
apportionment…the default rule should apply: ‘Ordinarily the royalty 
interest…would be carved proportionately from the two mineral 
ownerships…’”18 
Further, the Court noted that the 2003 Deed did not ever mention 
royalties, whereas the 1998 Deed clearly stated that the grantors reserve an 
undivided one-fourth interest in the royalties produced from the land.19 “A 
deed will convey every interest held by the grantor except that which is 
clearly reserved or excepted.”20 Looking to this rule, the court disagreed 
with the Wenske’s argument “that they could be unburdened by the NPRI 
simply by stating in the 2003 Deed that they conveyed the property to the 
Ealys ‘subject to’ the exception without even mentioning anything about 
royalties or that portions of the royalty estate owned by Vyvjala and Novak 
would be paid entirely by the Ealys.”21 
3. Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C.22 (Deed Construction; Fixed vs. 
Floating Royalty) 
In 1978, Phillip sold 40 acres of land in Karnes County to the Leals, 
excepting and reserving therefrom all minerals and royalties, but for “a one-
fourth non-participating royalty interest in and to all of the royalty paid on 
production” to the Leals.23 Phillip later conveyed his mineral interest to 
Cuanto Antes Mejor L.L.C., and entered into an oil and gas lease covering 
152.2 acres, including the Leals’ forty acres.24  
A dispute arose between the Leals and Cuanto about how the one-fourth 
royalty interest should be construed. Leal argued that the deed created a 
fixed royalty in one-fourth of production. Cuanto argued that the interest 
was a floating royalty interest, and as such, entitled them to one-fourth of 
all royalty paid on production. The trial court held that it was a floating 
royalty interest, and that the Leals were entitled to one-fourth of royalty.25 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (citing Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)). 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. (citing Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C., No. 04-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3999034 (Tex. 
App. Jul. 1, 2015). 
 23. Id. at *1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals first provided a review of the canons 
of construction, and provided specific examples in which a royalty has been 
found to be “fixed” or “floating.”26 The court construed the deed as a 
whole, rather than separate terms and provisions, and upheld the trial 
court’s ruling.27  
4. Dragon v. Harrell28 (Deed Construction; Fixed vs. Floating Royalty) 
In 1991, the Harrells conveyed ten acres of land to Dragon. The Harrell 
deed was subject to prior reservations affecting the mineral estate, and 
contained a new reservation in favor of Harrell, stating:  
SAVE AND EXCEPT HOWEVER, and there is hereby reserved 
unto the GRANTORS, their heirs and assigns, a free non-
participating interest in and to the royalty on oil, gas and other 
mineral in and under the hereinabove described property 
consisting of ONE-HALF (1/2) of the interest now owned by 
Grantors together with ONE-HALF (1/2) of the reversionary 
rights in and to the presently outstanding royalty in on and under 
said property, perpetually from date hereof.  It being understood 
and hereby provided, however, that GRANTORS, their heirs or 
assigns, shall not be entitled to participate in the bonus money or 
annual delay rentals paid, or to be paid, under any present or 
future oil, gas and mineral lease on said premises, and that it 
shall not be necessary for GRANTORS, their heirs or assigns, to 
join in the execution of any future oil, gas or mineral lease or 
leases on said premises.29 
In 2013, the Harrells filed suit against Dragon, arguing that the Harrell 
Deed reserved a fixed fractional royalty interest, and as such, they were 
entitled to one-half of total production of the oil and gas produced from the 
premises conveyed. Dragon filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory 
judgment that the Harrell deed “reserved a one-half (1/2) fraction of royalty 
interest in the Property.”30 The trial court granted the Harrell’s motion for 
summary judgment, and Dragon appealed.31 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Leal at *2-3. 
 27. Leal at *4. 
 28. Dragon v. Harrell, No. 04-14-00711-CV, 2016 WL 1238165 (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 
2016). 
 29. Id. at *4. 
 30. Id. at *1. 
 31. Id. 
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It was undisputed that Dragon owned the mineral estate; the parties 
disagreed on the meaning of the Harrell reservation. Dragon argued that 
because “the [reserved] interest consists of ‘the royalty on oil, gas, and 
other mineral[s],’ and not ‘all of the oil, gas, and other minerals,’ the 
[Harrell] Reservation clearly creates a fraction of royalty.”32 Dragon also 
asserted that “the reserved interest comes out of ‘the royalty on oil, gas and 
other minerals.’”33 Harrell contended that its reservation “reserved a fixed 
fractional royalty interest entitling [them] to…one-half (1/2) of total 
production of the oil and gas produced from the Subject Land.”34 
The Court reviewed the Harrell reservation and found that it reserved a 
“non-participating interest in and to the royalty” consisting of “the interest 
now owned by Grantors” and “the reversionary rights in and to the 
presently outstanding royalty.”35 By reading the deed as a whole, the Court 
concluded that the phrases mentioned referred to the prior reservations in 
the deed, and thus, proper construction of the Harrell reservation required 
an analysis of them. 
The Harrell deed was subject to four prior reservations; however only the 
first two were disputed and addressed by the Court. The first reservation 
provided: 
1. Mineral Reservation contained in, and herein quoted verbatim, 
from a Deed of Conveyance to Claude D. Winerich, from Frank 
A. Winerich and Ida Lee Winerich, dated February 17, 1940, 
recorded in Volume 118, Page 615–616, of the Deed Records of 
Karnes County, Texas, said reservation being as follows, to-wit: 
“It is expressly agreed under this conveyance that the Grantors 
hereby retain one-sixteenth (1/16th) or one-half (1/2) of the one-
eighth (1/8th) of all minerals in, on and under said above 
described 611 acres, said interest to be a participating interest.”36 
The second reservation provided: 
2. An undivided one-fourth (1/4th) interest in and to all of the oil 
royalty, gas royalty and royalty in other minerals reserved for the 
natural life of C.D. Winerich and Dorice Winerich, and 
contained in that certain Deed of Conveyance from C. D. 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at *2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *2-3. 
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Winerich and Dorice Winerich to Frances W. Bowers, said Deed 
of Conveyance being recorded in Volume 240, Pages 267–269, 
of the Deed Records of Karnes County, Texas.37 
The Court found that the first reservation was a participating mineral 
interest, including the right to develop, lease, and to receive bonus, delay 
rentals, and royalty.38 The second reservation created a life estate equal to 
one-fourth of the royalties paid on any oil, gas, or other minerals 
produced.39 The Harrells acquired the reversionary estate, subject to the life 
estate of Doris Winerich; therefore, they owned “15/16 of the mineral 
estate, less a life estate in a one-fourth floating royalty interest, but with a 
reversionary interest to that then-outstanding life estate royalty interest.”40 
Thus, based on these two prior reservations, the Harrell grantors could 
convey only the following: the fifteen-sixteenths of the mineral estate, less 
a life estate in a one-fourth floating royalty interest, but with a reversionary 
interest to that then-outstanding life estate royalty interest.41 
In its analysis, the Court applied a holistic approach, and its primary 
concern was to determine the parties’ intentions as expressed by the words 
the parties used.42  Further, the Court stated it would look at the four 
corners of the instrument and read the instrument as a whole, not isolating a 
single clause or phrase.43  
In analyzing the Harrell deed reservation, the Court stated “[t]he Harrell 
reservation does not identify the interest as being in and to the oil, gas, and 
other minerals; it unambiguously states it is an interest in the royalty on 
those minerals.”44  Further, the language makes clear that the royalty 
interest was reduced by the prior reservations.45  In examining the entire 
deed with all of its words and parts, the Court held that the Harrell deed 
reserved to the Harrell grantors a fraction of royalty interest, being one-half 
of fifteen-sixteenths of whatever royalty is to be paid from the land.46 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at *4. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 5. 
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The analysis of the Court follows the Hysaw decision’s guidance that an 
instrument’s language as a whole shall be considered to deduce the intent of 
the parties.  
5. Mueller v. Davis47 (Property Descriptions; Statute of Frauds) 
This case involved two deeds that did not contain a description of the 
property conveyed. In Mueller, the court held that for a deed to satisfy the 
statute of frauds, the description of the land must include information 
regarding the size, shape, and boundaries of the land being conveyed, or 
otherwise make reference to another instrument of record containing same, 
such that the land conveyed can be identified with reasonable certainty, by 
someone familiar with the area, to the exclusion of other property.48 
In 1991, Davis acquired two mineral deeds from Virginia Cope and 
James Mills that lacked descriptions of the property conveyed.49 The deeds 
referenced “[a]ll of those certain tracts or parcels of land out of the 
following surveys in Harrison County, Texas, described as follows,” and 
provided a listing of parcels identifying acreage by quantity included in 
what appeared to be oil and gas production units.50 Additionally, the deeds 
contained a “Mother Hubbard,” or coverall clause.  
Mueller later acquired mineral deeds from Cope and Mills, Davis’s 
grantors, which included the land previously conveyed to Davis. Mueller 
sued, alleging that the deeds to Davis were void under the statute of frauds. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis.51 
On appeal, the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.52 
The Court held that in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, a deed must 
have a specific description of the land. In this case, description of the 
acreage within a specific survey was not sufficient.53 Furthermore, the 
Court found that the Mother Hubbard clause was insufficient to rescue the 
lack of a legal description, as the clause was only effective if the deed 
contained a description adequate to identify specific property.54 The Court 
remanded for the lower court to decide what interests, if any, were 
conveyed. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 48. Id. at 627. 
 49. Id. at 625. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 633. 
 53. Id. at 628. 
 54. Id. at 631. 
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6. Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial55 (Deed Construction; Fixed vs. 
Floating Royalty) 
Annie Trial, along with her eight children, owned 278 acres in Karnes 
County, Texas. In 1949, she and six of her children sold their interests in 
the land to the other two children, reserving “an undivided interest in and to 
the 1/8 royalties paid the land owner upon production of oil, gas and other 
minerals.”56 Furthermore, the deed provided that all of the children would 
share equally in the royalties.57 
Medina, as successor in interest to the purchasers, executed an oil and 
gas lease with Marathon, and Medina and the Trials disagreed on what type 
of interest had been reserved.58 Medina argued that the deed reserved a 
fixed royalty of 1/8, which would mean that each child held a one-eighth 
interest in a one-eighth royalty.59 The Trials disagreed, and argued that they 
reserved a floating royalty of one-eighth of royalty.60 The trial court agreed 
with the sellers and found that the deed reserved a floating royalty interest 
for each of the children.61 
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court explained that 
the usual royalty provided in mineral leases when the 1949 deed was 
executed was one-eighth, and reasoned that the deed reference to “the 1/8 
royalty” was based on the erroneous assumption that a landowner’s royalty 
would always be one-eighth.62  
The Court noted that there was not a lease in place at the time the deed 
was executed, and found that the use of the phrase “the 1/8 royalty” should 
be construed to mean whatever future royalty interest a lessor might obtain 
in a future lease, whether that be one-eighth or a different fraction.63  
Additionally, the deed referenced “royalties paid to the landowner,” which 
the court believed suggested a floating royalty interest. Finally, the Court 
reasoned that because the lease repeatedly stated that royalties would be 
shared equally between the eight children, this was further evidence that the 
parties intended to create a floating royalty.64 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Medina Interests v. Trial, 469 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App. 2015). 
 56. Id. at 624. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 621.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 625. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 625-26. 
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1. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder65 (Deduction of Post-
Production Costs) 
Chesapeake acquired the Hyder Family lease covering 948 acres in the 
Barnett Shale. The lease provided for “‘a perpetual, cost-free (except only 
its proportion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) 
of gross production obtained’ from directional wells drilled on the lease but 
bottomed on nearby land.”66 Since the Hyders’ lease was not pooled with 
the producing land, the overriding royalty was created as inducement for 
the grant of surface use rights.67 The lease also contained a clause stating: 
“Lessors and Lessee agree that the holding in the case of Heritage 
Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank shall have no application to the terms and 
provisions of this Lease.”68  
Chesapeake deducted costs incurred in transporting, marketing, and 
selling the gas from the overriding royalty. The Hyders brought suit, 
arguing that their overriding royalty should be based on the sale price of the 
gas without any deduction of post-production costs. 69 The trial court ruled 
that the post-production costs had been improperly deducted, and awarded 
the Hyders $575,359.90.70 On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals 
affirmed.71  
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted its ruling in Heritage Resources, 
Inc. v. NationsBank, in which the Court held that although a royalty is 
“usually subject to post-production costs, including taxes…and 
transportation costs…the parties may modify this general rule by 
agreement.”72 Chesapeake argued that the phrase “cost free overriding 
royalty” was synonymous with the accepted definition of an overriding 
royalty, in that some are free of production costs, but generally bear their 
share of post-production costs. The Court rejected this argument largely on 
its finding that since the lease allowed the Hyders to take their overriding 
royalty in kind, they would have done so free of post-production costs. 
Additionally, Chesapeake argued that the lessors had the right to take the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016). 
 66. Id. at 872. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. See Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 427 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 72. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 483 S.W.3d at 872. 
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overriding royalty in kind, and had they done so, they might have incurred 
lower post-production costs than that of the lessee.73 The majority ruled that 
“‘cost-free’ in the overriding royalty provision includes post-production 
costs.”74 
In his dissent, Justice Brown, along with three other justices, took issue 
with the majority regarding the cost-free language of the overriding royalty 
only referring to post-production costs.75  The dissenters noted that even 
though the general rule is that the language references post-production 
costs, parties commonly intend for the royalty interest to be free of 
production costs.76  Thus, the dissenters did not think that the cost-free 
language expressed “an intent to abrogate the default rule that the lessee 
bears post-production costs.”77   
The majority also noted that production taxes are not always post-
production costs and that parties “often allocate tax liability on the royalty 
owners while at the same time specifically emphasizing that the royalty is 
free from production costs.”78 The dissenters, unlike the majority, did not 
find that the reference to production taxes supported the Hyders’ argument 
that “cost-free” means free of post-production costs.79 
2.  ConocoPhillips Co. v. Vaquillas Unproven Minerals, Ltd.80 (Retained 
Acreage Clauses) 
Conoco and Vaquillas were parties to two oil and gas leases.81 Both 
leases contained retained acreage clauses setting forth the number of acres 
surrounding each producing or shut-in gas well that Conoco was entitled to 
retain after its continuous development program ended.82  
The retained acreage clause in each lease provided that after Conoco's 
continuous drilling program ended: 
Lessee covenants and agrees to execute and deliver to Lessor a 
written release of any and all portions of this lease which have 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 875. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 877. 
 76. Id. at 878. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 879. 
 80. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Vaquillas Unproven Minerals, Ltd., No. 04-15-0066-CV, 
2015 WL 4638272 (Tex. App. Aug. 5, 2015). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
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not been drilled to a density of at least 40 acres for each 
producing oil well and 640 acres for each producing or shut-in 
gas well, except that in case any rule adopted by the Railroad 
Commission of Texas or other regulating authority for any field 
on this lease provides for a spacing or proration establishing 
different units of acreage per well, then such established 
different units shall be held under this lease by such production, 
in lieu of the 40 and 640–acre units above mentioned.83 
Conoco drilled several producing gas wells and assigned 640 acres to 
each.84 After Conoco would not release 600 acres that were assigned to 
each gas well, Vaquillas brought suit, alleging that because of a Railroad 
Commission field rule, Conoco breached the retained acreage clause.85 The 
trial court ruled that Conoco was only entitled to retain forty acres per 
well.86  Conoco appealed. 
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Railroad 
Commission did adopt a field rule applicable to the lease.87 The field rule 
states: 
Rule 2. No well shall hereafter be drilled nearer than FOUR 
HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (467) feet to any property line, 
lease line or subdivision line and no well shall be drilled nearer 
than ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (1,200) feet to any 
applied for, permitted or completed well in the same reservoir on 
the same lease, pooled unit or unitized tract.88 
The rule does not expressly provide for a specific number of acres per 
well, but, Railroad Commission Rule 38 states that if the spacing rule is 
467-1200, as is the case here, then the acreage requirement shall be forty 
acres for both oil and gas wells.89 The retained acreage clause in the lease 
did not contain an exception that limited the field rule to a maximum 
number of acres assigned to a well, but did contain an exception, which 
stated that if the field rule provides “spacing or proration establishing 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at *1. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *5. 
 88. Id. at *3. 
 89. Id.  
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different units of acreage per well,” a well would hold only the acreage 
provided for in that rule.90   
The Court found that the retained acreage clause in each of the leases 
included an exception requiring that if field rules were adopted providing 
for spacing or proration units of a different size in terms of acreage, then 
the field rules would control. In this case, the established spacing that 
provided for forty acres per well, as opposed to 640 acres per gas well.91   
3. XOG Operating, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration Limited 
Partnership92 (Assignments; Retained Acreage Provisions) 
XOG Operating assigned several leases covering approximately 1,625 
acres to Chesapeake for a primary term of two years and “as long thereafter 
as operations…are conducted upon [the leased premises] with no cessation 
for more than sixty (60) consecutive days.”93 The agreement provided that 
“[a]fter the expiration of the Primary Term…all rights under this 
[assignment agreement]…shall terminate, and said lease shall revert to 
Assignor, except as expressly provided in Article IX.”94 Article IX states, in 
pertinent part: 
Upon expiration of the Primary Term of this Assignment ... this 
Assignment and all rights created hereunder shall terminate as to 
all lands and depths covered hereby. Said lease shall revert to 
Assignor, save and except that portion of said lease included 
within the proration or pooled unit of each well drilled under 
this Assignment and producing or capable of producing oil 
and/or gas in paying quantities. The term ‘proration unit’ as used 
herein, shall mean the area within the surface boundaries of the 
proration unit then established or prescribed by field rules or 
special order of the appropriate regulatory authority for the 
reservoir in which each well is completed. In the absence of such 
field rules or special order, each proration unit shall be deemed 
to be 320 acres of land in the form of a square as near as 
practicable surroundings [sic] a well completed as a gas well 
producing or capable of production in paying quantities.... Upon 
termination or partial termination of this Assignment and the 
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rights created hereunder, Assignee shall promptly provide 
Assignor with a fully executed and recordable release of this 
Assignment. . . .95 
The assigned acreage was subject to a field rule that provided for a 
prescribed proration unit of 320 acres.96 Additionally, the rule required that 
any unit containing less than 320 acres be considered a “fractional proration 
unit.”97 During the primary term, Chesapeake drilled six producing wells 
and assigned fractional proration units for each well.98 The six units totaled 
802 acres.99 
XOG brought suit, alleging that the wells only retained the 802 acres and 
that the remaining 823 acres reverted to XOG.100 In response, Chesapeake 
argued that the parties intended for Chesapeake to retain the acreage 
prescribed by the field rules, and as a result Chesapeake was entitled to 
retain all of the acreage assigned to it.101 The trial court ruled in favor of 
Chesapeake, and the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed.102   
On appeal, the Court found that the retained acreage clause specified that 
the acreage retained by the assignee and excluded from reversion is the 
“proration unit” of each well.103  The Court applied the Railroad 
Commission field rules and established that each unit in question comprised 
320 acres in size.104 Ultimately, the Court held that when Chesapeake 
assigned “fractional proration units” to its wells, the meaning of the 
assignment was not modified.105 
4. Aycock v. Vantage Fort Worth Energy106 (Cotenancy; Effect of 
Ratification) 
Pannill, Desdemona and the Aycocks owned undivided mineral interests 
in 1,409 acres in Erath County, Texas.  In March 2008, Desdemona leased 
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its interests to Vantage for $750 per net mineral acre, resulting in a bonus of 
$394,574.60.  In September 2010, when the Aycocks learned of the 
Desdemona/Vantage lease, they sought to lease their interest with Vantage. 
Vantage never responded, no well was drilled, and in 2011, the Desdemona 
lease expired.107 
In May 2012, the Aycocks sued Vantage for unpaid bonuses, claiming 
that their September 2010 letter constituted a lease ratification, and as such, 
they were entitled to $750 an acre for their mineral interest in the leased 
tract. The Aycocks also asserted that Vantage improperly leased the entire 
property from Pannill and Desdemona. The trial court denied the Aycocks’ 
claims, and granted Vantage’s motion for summary judgment. 108 
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Aycocks had 
no basis on which they could make a claim against Vantage for unpaid 
bonuses.109 The Court noted that a cotenant can rightfully lease its 
undivided interest without joinder from the other cotenants.110 If a lessor 
leases all of the common property, the cotenants are left with two remedies 
– they can either (1) ratify the lease and request an accounting for all profits 
received by the leasing cotenant, or (2) refuse to ratify the lease and collect 
the value proportionate to their share of the minerals, less reasonable 
production expenses.111 
The Court also discussed other ways unleased mineral cotenants could 
ratify leases, including filing suit, executing and accepting a royalty deed, 
and/or executing a conveyance that recognizes the lease.112 If an unleased 
cotenant ratifies a lease, the unleased cotenant may sue the lessor cotenant 
for all of the money received by the lessor cotenant in the form of lease 
benefits that are attributable to the unleased cotenant’s share of the common 
land.113   
The Aycocks claimed that Vantage was unjustly enriched by the bonus 
payments that were made to Pannill and Desdemona and not to the unleased 
cotenants.114  The Court stated that Vantage was not unjustly enriched 
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because it did not profit at the expense of the unleased cotenants, as 
Vantage only made bonus payments to Pannill and Desdemona based on 
their net acreage.115  Furthermore, the Court held that the Aycocks could 
only recover bonus money from Pannill and Desdemona, and not Vantage, 
since owners of undivided interests are tenants in common.116   
5. KCM Financial, L.L.C. v. Bradshaw117 (Executive Duties) 
Betty Lou Bradshaw (“Bradshaw”) inherited an undivided one-half (1/2) 
non-participating royalty interest (“NPRI”) in 1773 acres in Hood County, 
Texas.118  The language reserving the NPRI mandated that any future 
royalty be “not less than” one-eighth, which was the usual royalty in 1960, 
when the NPRI was created.119  The non-participating royalty interest, 
being non-executive in nature, entitled Bradshaw to an interest in the gross 
production (the royalty interest), but did not include the right to negotiate 
lease terms or to receive any delay rentals or bonuses.120  
Steadfast Financial, L.L.C. (renamed KCM Financial) acquired the right 
to purchase the land. In a 2006 deal, KCM and Range Production, L.P. 
(“Range”) agreed to have KCM sell the land to Range, reserving the 
minerals, and to lease the mineral estate to Range. The lease provided for a 
one-eighth royalty and a bonus of $7,505 per acre, totaling more than 
$13,000,000 for the portion of the property burdened by Bradshaw’s 
interest.121 
Bradshaw sued both KCM and Range, alleging that KCM violated its 
fiduciary duty to her as the non-executive interest holder because the 
customary royalty rate for leases in Hood County at the time of the KCM-
Range lease had increased to one-fourth.122 Bradshaw argued that KCM 
engaged in self-dealing by negotiating an above-market bonus payment at 
the expense of a lower royalty.123 Bradshaw further asserted that Range 
conspired with and aided and abetted KCM’s breach.124 KCM argued that 
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there was no breach because it obtained the minimally acceptable royalty 
and it was the “same” for both the executive and non-executive.125 
The trial court dismissed Bradshaw’s claims, holding that neither KCM 
nor Range had breached any duty or obligation owed to her. The case came 
before the Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether evidence existed 
from which a jury could conclude that KCM breached a duty to Bradshaw 
in negotiating the terms of the mineral lease.126 The Court remanded 
Bradshaw’s claim against KCM for trial, but it dismissed her case against 
Range.  
When determining whether the executive breached its duty to the non-
executive, the court looks to “whether the executive engaged in acts of self-
dealing that unfairly diminished the value of the non-executive 
interest.”127  In this case, the court found that Bradshaw’s claim that the 
executive misappropriated a shared benefit and converted it into a benefit 
only for itself would constitute self-dealing if it was proven that the 
executive acted with the intent to diminish the value of the shared 
benefit.128  The court declined to create any bright-line rule that “merely 
obtaining the minimally acceptable royalty discharges, as a matter of law, 
the executive’s duty.”129 Rather, the court stated that in analyzing the 
executive’s duty, the transaction must be viewed as a whole, which requires 
a review of all of the terms of the lease.130   
In finding that, while “failure to obtain a market-rate royalty does not, in 
and of itself, constitute a breach of [the executive’s] duty,” the court 
reasoned that there was at least some evidence to support Bradshaw’s 
allegation that the mineral lease was the product of self-dealing.131 The 
court, therefore, affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment as to the breach of 
duty claim finding that summary judgment was not proper because a fact 
question existed.132 
In holding that Bradshaw’s derivative liability claims against Range 
failed as a matter of law, the Court determined there was no evidence that 
Range was complicit in the alleged breach of duty or otherwise had any 
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duty to Bradshaw in its dealings with KCM.133 Range, as lessee, engaged in 
“nothing more than a typical business transaction.”134 The Court agreed that 
“in negotiating with the executive, a lessee should not fear liability for 
doing nothing more than getting a good deal closed.”135 The Court held that 
even if KCM was found to have breached a duty owed to Bradshaw, its 
liability cannot be imputed to Range as a matter of law and, therefore, 
rendered judgment in favor of KCM.136 
In summary, the court reaffirmed that “[a]n executive owes a duty of 
utmost good faith and fair dealing to a non-executive,” and may not engage 
in self-dealing.137 The court declined to rule that a below-market royalty 
rate, in itself, constitutes a breach of that duty.138   
C. Industry Agreements 
1. Anderson Energy Corporation v. Dominion Oklahoma Texas 
Exploration and Producing Company139 (Joint Operating Agreement Not 
Limited to Interest Owned at Time of Execution) 
In 1980, Perlman and Sun Gas (“Sun”) entered into an agreement under 
which Perlman assigned to Sun an undivided 50% working interest in 
certain Eagle Ford-area oil and gas interests.140 The parties entered into a 
drilling program whereby Sun could earn additional interests by 
participating in additional drilling, and a joint operating agreement (“JOA”) 
to cover all operations under the agreement.141 The JOA included 
a preprinted preferential right to purchase provision and a typewritten area 
of mutual interest (“AMI”) agreement, supported by a plat depicting the 
boundaries of the AMI.142 
Thereafter, Anderson Energy Corporation (“Anderson”), successor to 
Sun and Dominion Oklahoma Texas Exploration and Production Company 
(“Dominion”), acquired Perlman’s interest.143 Dominion drilled numerous 
gas wells within the described AMI agreement, and then sold its interest to 
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HighMount without first presenting the offer to Anderson as required by the 
JOA.144 Without offering Anderson any right to participate, HighMount 
acquired additional interests in the area.145 Before the sale was completed, 
Anderson filed a breach of contract suit against Dominion (and other 
Dominion entities in the chain of title). 
Before the sale was completed, Anderson filed a breach of contract suit 
against Dominion (and other Dominion entities in the chain of title). 
Anderson alleged that the JOA was breached when Dominion (and its 
entities) acquired numerous interests and drilled more than 100 wells in the 
AMI without providing Anderson notice or the opportunity to participate.146  
Additionally, Anderson claimed that the preferential right was violated 
when HighMount acquired the properties from Dominion, since Anderson 
was not given any option to acquire the interests.147 
HighMount responded by arguing that the JOA only covered those 
interests owned by the parties upon execution of the JOA, and, 
therefore, the AMI and preferential right could not be breached in 
relation to the after-acquired properties.148  HighMount also claimed that 
the JOA had already terminated, or the claims were precluded by waiver or 
laches because Anderson failed to honor or assert rights under the JOA.149 
The San Antonio Court of Appeals relied on the “four corners” rule 
when it reviewed the JOA sections referencing the contract area.150  The 
Court disagreed with HighMount’s argument that numerous portions of the 
JOA were in present tense, and, therefore, the JOA must be read as 
including only the interests owned by the parties at the time that the JOA 
was executed.151  It reasoned that various clauses within the JOA suggested 
that the contract included oil and gas leases, as well 
as “lands.”152  Similarly, Exhibit A to the JOA identifies the “Contract 
Area,” and defines it as the “Land and Leases” and “Initial Wells” to be 
developed and operated under the JOA.153  The Court reasoned that the 
inclusion of “land” in addition to “leases” showed that the contract area was 
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intended to cover the initial leases and wells, as well as the unleased lands 
described in Exhibit A.154 
The Court held that the parties to the JOA intended to include interests 
acquired by them, or by their successors, in the future, within the lands of 
the contract area subject to the JOA.155  Additionally, the Court found that 
the contract area must include subsequently acquired interests in order to 
give the AMI effect156 and held that AMIs, by definition, are intended to 
cover future acquisitions.157 
In determining the JOA’s duration, the Court held that because there was 
not a specified term in the JOA, the JOA’s term was for a “reasonable 
time.”158  The Court did not address what constitutes a “reasonable time,” 
but remanded the issue to the lower court.159 
2. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation v. TRO-X, L.P.160 (Lease 
Termination) 
The Cooper family executed five leases with TRO-X.161 TRO-X 
assigned the leases to Eagle Oil & Gas Co. (“Eagle”), but retained a 
reversionary interest providing it with a “back-in” option to receive five 
percent of its original working interest.162 The “back-in” option also applied 
to “renewal(s), extension(s), or top lease(s) taken within one year of 
termination of the underlying interest.”163 Eagle subsequently assigned its 
interest to Anadarko, who began drilling operations.164   
The Coopers later sent Anadarko, Eagle’s assignee, a demand letter, 
claiming that the leases had been breached for failure to timely drill offset 
wells as required.165 Anadarko “determined that it had, in fact, breached the 
Off-Set Well Provision, and that Cooper’s written demand automatically re-
vested the leased mineral interests back into the Coopers.”166 Anadarko 
negotiated new leases with the Coopers and agreed to release the old leases, 
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but called the old leases “existing leases” in the negotiations.167 The new 
leases were executed and recorded in June of 2011. The releases were 
executed later in June, but not recorded until August of 2011.168  TRO-X 
was not informed of the new leases, nor did it consent to the releases. The 
new leases used the same form as the original TRO-X leases, but changed 
the length of the primary term, required a larger bonus, and imposed a 240-
day continuous drilling commitment.169 
TRO-X sued Anadarko, seeking to exercise its “back-in” option, 
claiming that the new leases were top leases.170 The trial court ruled in 
favor of TRO-X, but the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed and rendered 
judgment in favor of Anadarko.171 The main issue, as framed by the Court, 
was whether the delay between the execution of the new leases and the 
release of the old leases evidenced the Coopers’ intent that the new leases 
were top leases, which could only come into being upon the recording of 
the releases.172   
The Court noted that TRO-X bore the burden of proving that the Coopers 
intended to top-lease, and held that they failed to provide enough evidence 
to support such a conclusion.173 The Court instead found that the delay 
between the execution of the new leases and release of the old leases did 
not evidence an intent to top-lease, and that a “lessor is deemed to have 
waived any formal surrender requirements if it signs a new lease with the 
intent to terminate the old one.”174 
The effect of the Court’s ruling was to wash-out TRO-X’s back-in. This 
case continued the general practice in Texas precluding washouts in cases 
involving bad faith or a breach of a fiduciary duty, but allowing them, 
unless strictly forbidden by the terms of the agreement.  
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D. Regulation of Drilling and Production 
1. Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Limited Partnership175 (TXRRC Filings 
Do Not Constitute Constructive Notice) 
Charles Hooks leased his property in Hardin and Jefferson counties to 
Samson Lone Star Limited Partnership (now known as Samson Lone Star 
L.L.C. (hereinafter “Samson”)).176 The Jefferson County lease contained 
provisions that required Samson to prevent drainage from wells drilled on 
adjacent lands, and further provided that if a gas well was completed within 
1,320 feet from the leased tract (the “buffer zone”), Samson was required to 
either: (1) drill an offset well, (2) pay compensatory royalties, or (3) release 
the offset acreage.177 The lease did not allow for pooling.178 
In 2000, Samson began drilling a well (BSM 1) on a tract adjacent to the 
Hooks’ lease.179 Although the drillsite was outside the buffer zone, the well 
was directionally drilled so that the bottom was within 1,320 feet from the 
leased property.180 Samson provided Hooks a copy of a reconfigured plat 
that showed the bottom hole location to be outside the buffer zone. Samson 
filed the plat with the Texas Railroad Commission in December of 
2000.181 In 2001, Samson sought to amend Hooks’ lease and pool 50 acres 
of it into the BSM 1 unit.182 Based on the plat he was previously provided, 
Hooks agreed to the pooling, executed the required documents, and was 
sent royalty checks.183 
Hooks later discovered that the well bottomed inside of the lease’s 
buffer-zone and filed suit against Samson in 2007, alleging fraud, among 
other claims.184 Specifically, Hooks alleged that Samson made false 
representations concerning the location of the well’s bottom to avoid paying 
compensatory royalties that accrued before the unit was formed.185 Hooks 
also claimed that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to its claim 
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should not apply since Samson had fraudulently induced Hooks to believe 
that the BSM 1 well was 1,400 feet from Hooks’ lease.186 
The trial court found that Hooks could not have discovered the true facts 
within the limitations time period.187 Thus, Hooks had additional time to 
file the suit, and the jury awarded Hooks approximately twenty-one million 
dollars in damages.188 Samson appealed, and the appellate court reversed, 
finding that the statute of limitations barred Hooks’ claims because Hooks 
should have known that the BSM 1 well bottomed within his lease’s buffer-
zone when Samson proposed pooling.189 Hooks appealed to the Texas 
Supreme Court. 
The Court upheld the trial court’s ruling, holding “when the defendant’s 
fraudulent misrepresentations extend to the Railroad Commission record 
itself, earlier inconsistent filings cannot be used to establish, as a matter of 
law, that reasonable diligence was not exercised.”190 The Court found that it 
was up to the jury to determine whether Hooks used reasonable diligence 
because reasonable diligence is a question of fact, not law.191   
Ultimately, the Court held that there was some evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that the Hooks were delayed in bringing the claim because of 
Samson’s fraud.192 The Court stated that when fraudulent documents are 
part of the public record, a mineral owner is entitled to rely on them, even if 
there are other public records that contradict the fraudulent documents.193 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to consider the merits of Hooks’ 
claims.  
2. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Gulf Energy Exploration 
Corporation194 (Liability for Improper Plugging) 
This case arises out of the Railroad Commission’s orders requiring 
American Coastal Enterprises (“ACE”) to plug abandoned, inactive off-
shore wells.195 ACE owned a number of inactive offshore wells in the Gulf 
of Mexico. In March 2008, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered ACE 
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to plug the inactive wells, but in May 2008, ACE declared bankruptcy. 196 
As a result, the Commission assumed the plugging responsibilities, and 
Superior Energy Services was awarded a contract to plug eight of the ACE 
wells, two of which were at issue in this case.197 About a year prior to the 
service contract, Gulf Energy Exploration (“Gulf”) acquired a lease that 
encompassed eight of the inactive wells, and requested the Railroad 
Commission’s approval to begin reworking operations some of them.198 
After Gulf’s request, representatives from Gulf, ACE, and the 
Commission met to discuss the abandoned wells, and orally agreed that the 
Railroad Commission would delay plugging four of the eight wells.199 
Furthermore, the parties agreed that Gulf would post a bond and apply to 
take over operations of the four wells no later than June 12, 2008.200 Soon 
thereafter, the agreement was reduced to writing in the form of a “formal 
Settlement and Forbearance Agreement.”201 Despite the agreed upon terms, 
one of the four wells that Gulf was to operate was plugged between the time 
that the oral agreement was reached and the written agreement was 
executed.202 After obtaining legislative consent, Gulf brought suit against 
the Railroad Commission for breach of contract and negligence.203 
The trial judge ruled that the parties had entered into a binding oral 
contract.204 The Railroad Commission disagreed with the trial judge’s 
ruling, and also with the judge’s instructions to the jury because the 
instructions did not include a question on contract formation, nor did they 
include a question as to whether the Railroad Commission acted in good 
faith when plugging the well.205 The jury ruled in favor of Gulf, and 
awarded $2,500,000.00, the maximum amount permitted by legislative 
consent.206 The Railroad Commission appealed, and the Corpus Christi 
Court of Appeals affirmed.207   
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The Commission appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the Texas 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.208 The Court looked 
to Texas Natural Resources Code Section 89.001 and found that a state 
agency that regulates natural resources is protected if the agency acts in 
good faith.209 Although the evidence did not establish conclusively that the 
Commission acted in good faith in plugging the wrong well, a jury could 
reasonably infer that a Commission representative made a mistake as to 
which four wells were to be plugged, or a jury could reasonably infer that 
there was a clear discrepancy between the well that was to be plugged and 
the well that was improperly plugged.210 Because the Commission’s good 
faith argument was an issue of fact, the Court held that the question should 
have been submitted to the jury.211 
As to the contract issue, the Railroad Commission argued that a fact 
issue existed as to whether the contract was entered into when the parties 
met, or when the formal written document was signed, and as such, this 
issue should have been submitted to the jury.212 The Court agreed with the 
Railroad Commission, and found that the evidence submitted at trial raised 
a valid issue as to whether the parties reached a binding agreement at their 
meeting.213 Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that a contract based on the 
oral agreement was formed because the issue should have been submitted to 
the jury.214 
Finally, the Court held that the issue of the Railroad Commission’s good 
faith in plugging the well also should have been submitted to the jury.215 
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial 
court.216 
3. Sciscoe v. Enbridge Gathering (North Texas), L.P.217 (Trespass by 
Airborne Particles) 
In this case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that airborne particles 
can constitute trespass.218 From 2005 to 2009, various operators constructed 
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natural gas compressor stations and a metering station, collectively referred 
to as “the Ponder Compressor Station.”219 The sites were within a half-mile 
of DISH, which is a residential community in Denton County, Texas.220 
Beginning in 2005, the property owners complained to the operators of 
excessive noise and offensive odors, but were “assured the smell was 
merely an odorant and no harmful gases or pollutants were being 
emitted.”221 Three years later, other property owners contacted the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) about the noise and odor 
coming from the Ponder Compression Station, claiming that the activities 
were causing the residents to experience nausea and headaches.222 TCEQ 
conducted an investigation, but could not confirm the nuisances.223   
The property owners hired an environmental and sampling firm to 
investigate their claims.224 The firm’s report detected benzene, xylene, 
yethyl benzene, toluene, and other substances in the air surrounding the 
residential neighborhood.225 In March 2010, TCEQ “installed and began 
operating AugoGC Monitors to record hourly air samples of regulated 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs)”.226 TCEQ determined that the 
operators’ facilities were within emission limits.227   
The property owners filed suit in 2011, alleging that the noise and 
emissions from the operators’ facilities created a public and private 
nuisance and also that the chemicals in the air constituted trespass.228 The 
operators separately moved for summary judgment.229 The trial court 
granted the summary judgment without giving a basis for its decision.230 
On appeal, the main issue was whether property owners could seek 
damages over a decrease in property values due to trespass of light, noise, 
and airborne chemical particulates that originated and crossed over from the 
operators’ facilities.231 The operators asserted that the migration of 
particulates did not constitute trespass because as a matter of law, trespass 
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requires a physical entry and a significant deposit of chemical particulates 
on property.232    
The Court of Appeals relied on Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza 
Energy Trust to analyze the trespass cause of action.233 The Texas Supreme 
Court has recognized invasions of airspace as a trespass.234 Trespass occurs 
when a physical entry that is not authorized has occurred on the surface of a 
property or in the adjacent airspace of a property.235 An “invisible trespass” 
can become a cause of action if there is an actual injury caused.236   
Because the Court could not hold as a matter of law that trespass did or 
did not occur, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings on 
whether a migration of airborne particulates originating from the operators’ 
facilities can constitute trespass.237 Although the Court did not rule on 
whether airborne particulates can constitute trespass, the Court 
acknowledged that trespass may occur if an operator intentionally and 
voluntarily allows particulates to enter another’s property and those 
particulates caused injury.238    
E. Litigation 
1. Titan Operating, L.L.C. v. Marsden239 (Nuisance; Quasi-Estoppel) 
The Marsdens purchased their home near Aledo, Texas in 1997. It was 
located on the northwest side of a 6.2-acre tract in a residential 
neighborhood.240 In 2004, they executed an oil and gas lease to Sullivan.241 
The lease contained a well-setback provision that provided that “no well 
[could] be drilled within two hundred (200) feet of any residence or 
barn…” without consent from the lessor.242 Another provision gave the 
lessee the right to access the leased premises to reach drilling sites and 
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other related operations on adjacent land,243  and an addendum to the lease 
provided that: 
[The Marsdens] and [Sullivan] agree that no drilling or other 
activities will be conducted upon the surface of [the Marsdens' 
property] and that no roads, pipelines, tanks, heaters, separators, 
injection wells, or other surface equipment will be placed on [the 
Marsdens' property] without the prior, written consent of [the 
Marsdens. [B]ut [Sullivan] shall have the right to prospect, drill, 
and produce oil and gas from beneath the surface of [the 
Marsdens' property] by operations which it may conduct on 
adjoining or nearby lands through the drilling, operating, and 
maintaining of directional wells located on the surface of such 
adjoining or nearby lands.244 
The Marsden lease was eventually assigned to Titan Operating, L.L.C. 
(“Titan”).245 Titan decided to place its drillsite on the land immediately to 
the North of the Marsden’s property, the southwest corner of which was 
approximately 176 feet north of the Marsdens’ house, with the actual well 
sitting 300 feet from the Marsdens’ house.246 Five additional wells were 
drilled north of the Marsdens’ property.247 The Marsdens complained of 
noise from the drilling and operations, and claimed to not have been able to 
sleep or enjoy their house.248   
The Marsdens brought suit for nuisance and sought damages based on 
the loss of enjoyment of their property as well as the decrease in property 
value.249 The jury found that Titan Operating deliberately created a private 
nuisance and that the Marsdens were not estopped from bringing a nuisance 
claim.250 The jury awarded the Marsdens $36,000 (being $18,000 to Marcus 
Marsden and $18,000 to Laura Marsden).251 Titan filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asking the trial court to disregard the 
jury’s decision, but the trial court denied the motion. Titan appealed.252  
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on 
the grounds that the affirmative defense of quasi-estoppel should have 
resulted in a directed verdict for Titan.253 Quasi-estoppel applies when it 
would be “unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position 
inconsistent with the one to which he acquiesced or from which he accepted 
a benefit.”254 For this affirmative defense to apply, “the party being 
estopped must have had knowledge of all material facts at the time of the 
conduct on which the estoppel is based.”255  
In this case, the addendum to the Marsden lease specifically gave the 
lessee “the right to prospect, drill, and produce oil and gas from beneath the 
surface of [the leased premises] by operations…on adjoining or nearby 
lands through the drilling, operating, and maintaining of directional wells 
located on the surface of such adjoining or nearby lands.”256 The Court 
found that Marcus Marsden “recognized that the terms of the bargain that 
he struck in his lease were that drilling could not occur on his property but 
that the southeast corner of his property could be used to travel to a drilling 
site and that drilling could occur on adjoining land.”257 During lease 
negotiations, the Marsdens had the opportunity to negotiate for larger 
setback provisions, but did not. There were no allegations of negligence by 
Titan, nor was there any evidence that Titan violated any laws or 
regulations in drilling its wells.258 Furthermore, the Marsdens accepted 
royalties from the well, which was pooled with a portion of their land.259 
Because the Marsdens “unconscionably accepted benefits of transactions… 
while taking positions that inconsistently attempt[ed] to avoid the 
obligations and effects (including all of the circumstances forming the 
gravamen of their nuisance claim) of those same transactions,” the Court 
held that as a matter of law, quasi-estoppel barred the Marsdens’ claim of 
nuisance against Titan.260   
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2. Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corporation261 (Nuisance; Negligence; 
Causation) 
In 2010, the Cernys leased the minerals underlying their one-acre tract in 
Karnes County, Texas to Marathon Oil Corporation’s predecessor.262 The 
lease authorized Marathon to use the surface of the Cernys’ land, but 
Marathon has not placed any wellheads or infrastructure on it.263 The 
Cernys’ lease was pooled with other leases as part of the Brysch-Adams 
Unit. The Unit contains three wells.264   
In 2013, the Cernys sued Marathon and Plains Exploration for private 
nuisance, negligence, gross negligence and negligence per se, claiming that 
noise, odors, and toxic chemicals from their oil and gas operations made the 
Cerneys sick and damaged their property.265 The district court granted 
Marathon and Plains’ no-evidence and traditional summary judgment 
motions.266 The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the 
evidence provided by the Cernys, “consisting of lay affidavits and non-
medical expert testimony” failed to present more than a scintilla of 
evidence to support their claims.267 
The general rule in Texas is “that expert testimony is necessary to 
establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge 
and experience of lay persons.”268 In this case, the Cerny’s petition only 
sought recovery for nuisance symptoms typical of discomfort rather than 
disease, and disclaimed “any ‘personal injury damages’ that would invoke 
[the need for expert testimony under] Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner”; 
therefore, they did not present medical expert testimony to prove causation 
of their physical injuries.269  
The Cernys also relied on Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. in support of 
their claim that medical expert testimony was unnecessary.270 The Court 
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rejected this argument and distinguished the facts of this case from those of 
Morgan. The Court agreed with the defendants’ argument that “the Cernys’ 
nuisance and negligence claims are in the nature of toxic tort claims which 
fall outside a lay person’s general knowledge and experience, and must 
therefore be proven with expert testimony.”271 “Plaintiffs seeking relief for 
injuries of any nature caused by exposure to or migration of a toxic 
substance must meet the stringent proof requirements imposed by the Texas 
Supreme Court in Havner and its progeny.”272 In Havner, the Court ruled 
that: 
expert testimony is necessary in a toxic tort case in order to 
prove (i) the applicable standard of care, (ii) that the defendant’s 
conduct more than doubled the risk, as shown by two 
epidemiological studies, (iii) that the plaintiff’s injuries were 
caused by the defendant’s conduct, and (iv) that the plaintiff’s 
injuries were not caused by other possible sources.273 
For the Cernys’ claim that they became ill from the oil and gas 
operations, the Court found that the Cernys suffered from chronic pre-
existing health conditions.274 For the Cernys’ property damage claim, more 
specifically that their home had developed foundation damage, the Court 
found that the home had foundation damage prior to when Marathon began 
operations.275 Furthermore, the Cernys failed to negate other possible 
sources of chemicals other than Marathons’ operations, which prompted the 
Court to hold that “an expert’s failure to rule out alternative causes of injury 
renders the opinion unreliable, and legally constitutes no evidence.”276  
In rejecting the Cernys’ nuisance claims for loss of enjoyment and use of 
their land, the Court held that their claims resulting from dust, noise, traffic, 
and foul odors were “too conclusory and speculative.”277 Further, the Court 
of Appeals clarified that the causation standard for nuisance and negligence 
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claims based on noises, odors, and other exposures to oil and gas operations 
is that an expert must rule out alternative causes of injury.278   
3. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore L.L.C.279 (Subsurface 
Trespass) 
In this trespass case, the Court ruled that ownership of oil and gas does 
not include the right to control other portions of the subsurface.280 
Anadarko leased the Chaparral Wildlife Management Area.281 The area is 
south of the Briscoe Ranch, which was leased to Lightning Oil 
(“Lightning”).282 Anadarko was required under the Chaparral lease to use 
off-site drilling when “prudent and feasible.”283 To comply with this 
requirement, Anadarko acquired a surface and subsurface agreement from 
the Briscoe Ranch surface owner.284 The agreement authorized Anadarko to 
place drilling rigs on the ranch property, and authorized Anadarko to drill 
horizontal wells that would pass through the Briscoe Ranch lease and be 
bottomed in the Chaparral lease.285   
Lightening filed a trespass suit against Anadarko, alleging that it had the 
exclusive right to decide who could drill the property.286 The trial court 
ruled in favor of Anadarko and Lightening appealed.287   
After reviewing various cases288 that dealt with a party’s ownership 
rights in the subsurface of a tract where the mineral rights were severed 
from the surface rights, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.289 The 
Court found that a party who owns the oil and gas rights does not own the 
right to control other components of the subsurface.290 Instead, the owner of 
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the surface estate owns the non-minerals beneath the surface.291 Therefore, 
the Court ruled in favor of Anadarko and held that the surface owner of the 
Briscoe Ranch could grant Anadarko permission to drill through the 
subsurface to reach the Chaparral lease.292   
4. Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. v. Marathon Oil Company293 (Property 
Damage; Discovery Rule) 
Marathon had a lease on a 20,000-acre ranch, where it plugged and 
abandoned Well 812 in 1989.294 Well 812 was used for a water flood 
project until Marathon ceased all operations shortly thereafter.295 Ranchero 
purchased the property in 2004.296 In 2008, Aspen, a subsequent oil and gas 
lessee, discovered that Well 812 was leaking a large amount of salt water 
due to water injection nearby.297 Furthermore, Aspen discovered that the 
leak was due to the well’s improper plugging, which caused surface and 
subsurface pollution and destruction.298   
Ranchero filed a claim against Marathon, alleging that the leak had killed 
vegetation on the property and decreased the property value by 
$3,700,000.00.299 Marathon moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Ranchero did not have standing because it was not the owner of the land at 
the time of the alleged negligent plugging and that the suit was barred by 
the statute of limitations.300 The trial court granted Marathon’s motion for 
summary judgment.301  Ranchero appealed.302   
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part.303 
The Court stated:  
the well-established rule in Texas [is] that a cause of action for 
injury to land is a personal right belonging to the person who 
owns the property at the time of injury, and that a mere 
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subsequent purchaser does not have standing to recover for 
injuries committed before his purchase.304  
In this case, Marathon’s negligent plugging occurred before Ranchero 
owned the property and the salt water damage occurred after Ranchero’s 
purchase; therefore, the Court found that Ranchero had standing to bring a 
claim.305   
While Ranchero had standing to assert a claim, its claims were barred by 
the two-year statute of limitations because the claim was filed more than 
two years after Aspen discovered the leaking salt water.306 The discovery 
rule did not toll the statute, since the damage from the salt water was not 
inherently undiscoverable.307  “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it 
is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations 
period despite due diligence.”308 
 5.  Cosgrove v. Cade309 (Unambiguous Errors in Deeds; Notice; 
Discovery Rule) 
This case reiterates that mineral owners should carefully review their 
deeds to ensure that mineral reservations are properly 
included. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “[p]lainly obvious and 
material omissions in an unambiguous deed charge parties with irrebuttable 
notice for limitations purposes.”310 The discovery rule, which tolls the 
statute of limitations until a party discovers the injury giving rise to the 
claim, applies in limited situations where the nature of the injury incurred is 
inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively 
verifiable.311 The statute of limitations begins to run when a deed is 
executed and continues to run when a deed is properly recorded because it 
is publicly available.312  
Barbara Cosgrove (“Cosgrove”) purchased a two-acre tract from Michael 
and Billie Cade (“Cades”) in 2006.313 The deed, each page of which was 
signed or initialed by the Cades, did not reserve the mineral rights, but the 
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Real Estate Contract’s “Special Provisions” clause stated: “‘Sellers to retain 
all mineral rights.’”314 A closing document prepared by the title company 
required both parties “fully cooperate, adjust, and correct any errors or 
omissions and to execute any and all documents needed or necessary to 
comply with all provisions of the above mentioned real estate 
contract.”315 The parties did not dispute that “the deed mistakenly – but 
unambiguously – failed to reserve the mineral rights.”316 
Prior to the sale, the Cades leased their mineral interests to Dale 
Resources, L.L.C., and ultimately Chesapeake became the operator of the 
lease.317 In 2010, the Cades demanded a corrective deed from the 
Cosgroves when Chesapeake alerted them to a “problem” with the deed’s 
mineral reservation.318 The Cosgroves refused, claiming that the Cades’ 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.319  In 2011, the Cades sued 
Cosgrove for a declaratory judgment that they were the owners of the 
mineral interests.320 In Texas, a four-year statute of limitations governs 
deed reformation claims.321 The trial court granted summary judgment, 
finding that the Cades’ claims were time-barred.322 The court of appeals 
reversed, stating the discovery rule delayed the accrual of limitations for the 
deed reformation claim.323 
Texas law provides for a rebuttable presumption that a grantor has 
immediate knowledge of defects in a deed that result from mutual 
mistake.324 Since a grantor has actual knowledge that the deed is incorrect, 
the limitations period on a claim to reform an incorrect deed begins as soon 
as the deed is executed.325   
The discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until a party 
discovers the injury giving right to the claim, applies in limited situations 
where “the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable and 
the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.”326 Therefore, the Court 
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held where a deed is unambiguous, the “[p]arties are charged as a matter of 
law with knowledge of an unambiguous deed’s material omissions from the 
date of its execution, and the statute of limitations runs from that date.”327 
The parties have actual knowledge of what a deed includes and 
excludes.328 Where a reservation of rights, such as the Cades' mineral 
reservation, is omitted from the instrument, “the presumption of knowledge 
is irrefutable because the alleged error is obvious.”329  
Moreover, “obvious omissions are not inherently undiscoverable.”330 
Texas Property Code 13.002 puts all parties on notice, including the 
grantor, of a deed’s contents.331 Mineral interest owners must read and 
inspect their deeds to ensure that their mineral interests are properly 
reserved.332  The Cades’ injury could not be deemed undiscoverable 
because the deed was publicly available.333 “Section 13.002 establishes a 
lack of diligence in the discovery of a mistaken omission in an 
unambiguous deed as a matter of law.”334 As the Court provided in Hooks 
v. Sampson Lone Star, L.P., “(1) reasonable diligence includes examining 
‘readily available information in the public record,’ and (2) ‘reasonable 
diligence should lead to information in the public record.’”335 The Court 
rejected the Cades’ claims, finding that they could not argue they acted with 
reasonable diligence when they failed to notice a plain mistake when 
executing their own deed, as the deed was readily available for inspection at 
the time of signing and in the public records for the remainder of the 
limitations period.336  
The Court has now expressly found that the discovery rule does not toll 
the statute of limitations where an unambiguous deed includes plainly 
obvious and material omissions.337  The statute begins to run at execution, 
when all parties are put on notice.338 If a deed is properly recorded, Texas 
Property Code 13.002 imposes notice on the grantor of the deed’s 
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contents.339 Therefore, mineral owners should be especially careful to 
review deeds to ensure reservations are properly included.   
III. Legislative Update 
A. Transfer on Death Deeds340 
Effective September 1, 2015, Texas Estate Code Section 114.151 allows 
for Transfer on Death Deeds. Lawmakers believe this provision will 
provide a simplified process for the non-probate transfer of real estate. 
A Transfer on Death deed operates the same as any other conveyance, 
except that title does not pass to the grantee until the grantor’s death.  The 
property conveyed passes outside of the grantor’s estate.  To be effective, a 
Transfer on Death Deed must be signed, notarized, and recorded in the deed 
records of the county where the property is located prior to the death of the 
grantor.  It may not be created through the use of a power of attorney.  An 
unrecorded Transfer on Death Deed is ineffective to convey property.  
The statute permits the naming of alternative beneficiaries in the 
Transfer on Death Deed; however, the statute does not permit a grantor to 
convey under complicated distribution provisions or to several people in 
varying percentages.  If the grantor changes his or her mind, a Transfer on 
Death Deed may be revoked by the filing of a “Cancellation of Transfer on 
Death Deed” form or by the recording of a subsequently executed 
conveyance of the same property.  A Transfer on Death Deed may not be 
revoked by a will. 
B. House Bill 2207341 
Effective January 1, 2016, the general rule of “first in time, first in right” 
no longer applies in the case of real estate mortgages and their priority over 
subsequently filed oil and gas leases.  House Bill 2207 creates a 
legislatively imposed subordination of a prior mortgage to a subsequent oil 
and gas lease. This legislation will result in savings in time, energy and 
costs to producers that were previously required to obtain subordination 
agreements from lienholders. 
In the case where a lease is taken on land that is already subject to a 
mortgage and the mortgage is foreclosed, the statute provides that the oil 
and gas lease does not terminate, even if the lease has not been 
subordinated to the mortgage.  Under the bill, when the leased property is 
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later sold in a foreclosure sale, any rights granted to the lessee to use the 
surface terminate, and any royalty payments which become due after the 
sale pass to the purchaser of the foreclosed property. 
The loss of surface rights will not likely be an issue on leases of smaller 
tracts, but might become problematic on large tracts or tracts on which oil 
and gas wells have been or are currently being drilled. For this reason, it 
may still be advisable to obtain a subordination agreement from a 
lienholder for tracts of land upon which surface operations are conducted or 
contemplated. 
C. House Bill 40342 
House Bill 40 confirmed the state’s exclusive jurisdiction to regulate oil 
and gas operations. Additionally, the bill expressly preempts a municipality 
or other political subdivision from regulating oil and gas operations. 
Although the bill preserves a municipality’s authority to regulate 
“aboveground activity” that relates to oil and gas operations, it does not 
preserve any other political subdivision’s authority.   
In regard to “aboveground activity,” a municipality can assert 
jurisdiction over oil and gas operations if (i) it is commercially reasonable, 
(ii) it does not effectively prohibit oil and gas operations conducted by a 
reasonably prudent operator, and (iii) it is not otherwise preempted from 
doing so by state or federal law.  The bill lists examples of what constitute 
“aboveground activity,” and includes fire and emergency response, traffic, 
lights, noise, notice, and setback requirements.  
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